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Introduction 
 This article brings together some of the recent literature on ―industry platforms‖ and 
shows how it relates to managing innovation within and outside the firm as well to dealing 
with technological and market disruptions and change over time. First, we define the term 
―platform‖ and why this concept seems to have become increasingly important for researchers 
and managers. Second, we clarify differences in the literature with regard to how to define 
different types of platforms and associated economic, managerial, and strategic concepts. 
Third, we review the case of Intel and other examples to illustrate the range of technological, 
strategic, and business challenges that platform leaders and their competitors face as markets 
and technologies evolve. Finally, we identify practices associated with effective platform 
leadership and avenues for future research to deepen our understanding of this important 
phenomenon and what firms can do to manage platform-related competition and innovation.  
 
Platform Definitions and Distinctions 
 What managers and researchers refer to as platforms exist in a variety of industries, 
especially in high-tech businesses driven by information technology. Microsoft, Apple, 
Google, Intel, Cisco, ARM, Qualcomm, EMC, and many other firms, small and large, build 
hardware and software products for computers, cell phones, and consumer electronics devices 
that in one form or another serve as what we can call industry platforms. These firms and their 
hundreds if not thousands of partners also participate in platform-based ―ecosystem‖ 
innovation (Moore, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Platforms are distinct in that they are 
often associated with ―network effects‖: that is, the more users who adopt the platform, the 
more valuable the platform becomes to the owner and to the users because of growing access 
to the network of users and often to a growing set of complementary innovations.  In other 
words, there are increasing incentives for more firms and users to adopt a platform and join 
the ecosystem as more users and complementors join.
1
  
Industry platforms and associated innovations, as well as platforms on top of or 
embedded within other platforms have become increasingly pervasive in our everyday lives 
(for example, microprocessors embedded within personal computers or smart phones that 
access the Internet, on top of which search engines such as Google and social media networks 
                                                 
1
 We use the term ―complementor‖ in the sense defined by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), as a short-hand 
for ―the developer of a complementary product‖ where two products are complements if greater sales of one 
increase demand for the other.  Formally, A and B are complements if the valuation by consumers of A and B 
together is greater than the sum of the valuation of A alone and of B alone.
 
 Va+b = (1 + δ) (Va + Vb),   δ > 0. 
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such as Facebook exist, and on top of which applications operate, etc.).  Not surprisingly, 
several distinct academic literatures have studied this phenomenon. The term platform has 
become nearly ubiquitous, appearing in the new product development and operations 
management field (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997; Simpson et al., 2005); in technology strategy 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002 and 2008, Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006); and in 
industrial economics (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Evans, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). Our analysis 
of a wide range of industry examples, however, suggests there are two predominant forms of 
platforms: internal or company-specific platforms, and external or industry-wide platforms. 
In this paper, we define internal (company or product) platforms as a set of assets 
organized in a common structure from which a company can efficiently develop and produce 
a stream of derivative products (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997; Muffato and Roveda, 2002). We 
define external (industry) platforms as products, services or technologies that are similar in 
some ways to the former but provide the foundation upon which outside firms (organized as a 
‗business ecosystem‘) can develop their own complementary products, technologies, or 
services (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer, 2009a). These are somewhat high-level 
definitions, however, and it is instructive to see how researchers have treated the distinctions 
between these two types of platforms at a more detailed level. 
 
Research on Internal and External Platforms2 
  Internal Platforms 
 The first popular usage of the term platform seems to have been in the context of new 
product development and incremental innovation around reusable components or technologies. 
We refer to these as internal platforms in that a firm, either working by itself or with suppliers, 
can build a family of related products or sets of new features by deploying these components.  
In many ways, this is an old idea: Brown (1995) indicated in his history of Baldwin 
Locomotive Works that as early as 1854, the US locomotive manufacturer developed a 
―rigorous program to standardize locomotive parts. Now standard components could be used 
across a number of Baldwin-standard engines or even in custom designs‖ (Brown 1995: 21). 
Product designers and engineers more broadly are generally trained to systematically reuse 
patterns and design rules from previous work and improve upon prior art and the work of 
others (Norman, 1988; Baldwin and Clark, 1999; Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel, 2011).  
                                                 
2
 This section follows Gawer (2009a) [―Platform Dynamics and Strategies: from Products to Services‖].  
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 Creating a reusable foundation for product development within the firm requires 
specific planning and management. For example, Wheelwright and Clark (1992) describe how 
various companies have developed ―product platforms‖ to meet the needs of different 
customers simply by modifying, adding, or subtracting different features. McGrath (1995), 
Meyer and Lehnerd (1997), Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998), Krishman and Gupta (2001), and 
Muffatto and Roveda, (2002) all have done research in a similar vein.  They have defined 
these kinds of platforms as subsystems and interfaces that form a common structure from 
which a company can efficiently develop and produce a family of products, such as new 
automobiles or consumer electronics devices. Robertson and Ulrich (1998) propose an even 
broader definition, viewing platforms as the collection of assets (i.e., components, processes, 
knowledge, people and relationships) that a set of products share. In the marketing literature, 
Sawhney (1998) even suggests that managers should move from ―portfolio thinking‖ to 
―platform thinking,‖ which he defines as  understanding the common strands that tie the 
firm‘s offerings, markets, and processes together, and exploit these commonalities to create 
leveraged growth and variety.  
 These researchers have identified, with a large degree of consensus, several potential 
benefits of internal platforms: savings in fixed costs; efficiency gains in product development 
through the reuse of common parts and ―modular‖ designs, in particular, the ability to produce 
a large number of derivative products with limited resources; and flexibility in product feature 
design. One key objective of platform-based new product development seems to be the ability 
to increase product variety and meet diverse customer requirements, business needs, and 
technical advancements while maintaining economies of scale and scope within 
manufacturing processes – an approach also associated with ―mass customisation‖ (Pine, 
1993).  
 The empirical evidence indicates that, in practice, companies have successfully used 
product platforms to increase product variety, control high production and inventory costs, 
and reduce time to market. Most of the early research is about durable goods, whose 
production processes involve manufacturing, such as in the automotive, aircraft, equipment 
manufacturing, and consumer electronics sectors. Companies frequently associated with 
module-based product development and families of products derived from common internal 
platforms include Sony, Hewlett-Packard, NDC (Nippon Denso), Boeing, Honda, Rolls 
Royce, and Black & Decker (Lehnerd, 1987; Rothwell and Gardiner, 1990; Whitney, 1993; 
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Sabbagh, 1996; Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1997; Feitzinger and Lee, 1997;  Cusumano and 
Nobeoka, 1998; Reichtin and Kranz, 2003; Simpson et al., 2005).  
 Researchers have also identified a few fundamental design principles or ‗design rules‘ 
that appear to operate in internal product platforms, in particular the stability of the system 
architecture, and the systematic or planned reuse of modular components (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Baldwin and Woodward, 2009).  We can see as well a fundamental trade-off couched in 
terms of functionality and performance: the optimization of any particular subsystem may 
result in the sub-optimization of the overall system (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997). In this sense, 
internal platforms may promote only incremental innovation or constrain some types of 
innovation – a theme that we will return to later in this article.  
 We should also mention the concept of a ―supply-chain platform,‖ although we see 
this as a special case of internal platform.  Here, a set of firms follow specific guidelines to 
supply intermediate products or components to the platform owner or the final product 
assembler. The objective of supply-chain platforms is also to improve efficiency and reduce 
cost such as by the systematic reuse of modular components.  Major potential benefits are that 
a firm with access to a platform supply chain can tap into external capabilities to find more 
innovative or less expensive components and technologies.  At the same time, the firm may 
have less control over the components and technology, which can have its own negative 
consequences.  Supply-chain platforms are common in assembly industries, such as consumer 
electronics, computers, and automobiles (Tierney et al., 2000; Bremner et al., 2004; Szczesny, 
2003; Sako, 2003, 2009; Zirpoli and Becker, 2008; Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002; Brusoni, 2005; 
Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006). We can also link this literature to other research on sharing 
modules across firms (Staudenmayer, Tripsas and Tucci, 2005), limits of modularity as a 
design strategy (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001), and industry architecture or structure (Jacobides, 
Knudsen and Augier, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007).  The research, though, suggests that a 
key distinction between supply chains and industry platforms is that, in the case of industry 
platforms, the firms developing the complementary innovations – such as applications for 
Windows or the Apple App Store – do not necessarily buy from or sell to each other.  Nor are 
they usually part of the same supply chain or share patterns of cross-ownership, such as 
Toyota does with its major component suppliers. 
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  External Platforms 
 We have defined external or industry platforms, the main subject of this paper, as 
products, services or technologies developed by one or more firms, and which serve as 
foundations upon which a larger number of firms can build further complementary 
innovations and potentially generate network effects. There is a similarity to internal 
platforms in that industry platforms provide a foundation of reusable common components or 
technologies, but they differ in that this foundation is ―open‖ to outside firms. The degree of 
openness can also vary on a number of dimensions – such as level of access to information on 
interfaces to link to the platform or utilize its capabilities, the type of rules governing use of 
the platform, or cost of access (as in patent or licensing fees) (see, for example, Anvaari and 
Jansen, 2010).   
 There are some similarities between the concept of industry platform and that of a 
dominant design. A ―dominant design‖ (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback, 1994), 
when it emerges, sets the standard for what form and features users expect a particular 
product to take in the future. Early research on dominant designs highlighted that once a 
dominant design emerges, it shifts the focus of competition from design to manufacturing, 
and the focus of innovation from product innovation to process innovation. It also suggested 
that the product life cycle dynamics that lead to a dominant design is a long process of 
problem solving characterized by a logic that progressively leads an industry to standardize 
core components. Recent theoretical developments on dominant designs (Murmann and 
Frenken, 2006), recognizing that earlier research had been imprecise on products‘ 
architectural hierarchies, have proposed a systematic hierarchical model of dominant designs. 
This line of research articulates a model of dominant designs as a nested hierarchy of 
technology cycles, and makes a distinction between ―core‖ and ―peripheral‖ subsystems and 
components, where the stabilization of one level of the hierarchy allows for more innovation 
at peripheral levels.  
 The two concepts differ, however, in that while the concept of dominant design rests 
on industry-level evolutionary mechanisms with no particular agency, industry platforms are 
―manageable objects‖ that organizations purposefully manage to bring multiple parties within 
the industry together – primarily users and complementors.3 Industry platforms, like internal 
company platforms, do not simply emerge without deliberate, firm-driven agency or 
                                                 
3
 We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for this insight, 
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deliberate managerial decisions and actions. And in platform markets – those industries 
characterized by a foundation technology around which third-party firms create 
complementary innovations, with adoption driven by positive feedback loops and network 
effects – the most likely winner is not necessarily the originator of the dominant design or the 
owner of the most elegant product. The most likely winner is the owner of the ―best‖ platform, 
the characteristics of which we discuss later in this section.   
 Despite different degrees of openness to outside complementors, various products and 
technologies have served as industry platforms: the Microsoft Windows and Linux operating 
systems; Intel and ARM microprocessors; Apple‘s iPod, iPhone, and iPad designs along with 
the iOS operating system; Apple‘s iTunes and App Store; Google‘s Internet search engine and 
Android operating system for smart phones; social networking sites such as Facebook, 
LinkedIn, and Twitter; video-game consoles; and the Internet itself. We can even view 
payment technologies, ranging from credit and debit cards to micropayment schemes, as 
platforms that enable different types of financial transactions (Leblebici 2012).  
 Early research on industry platforms and their innovation ecosystems generally focused 
on computing, telecommunications, and other information-technology intensive industries. 
For example, Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999), in their study of the computer industry, 
analyzed platforms as a bundle of standard components around which buyers and sellers 
coordinated their efforts. West (2003) defined a computer platform as an architecture of 
related standards that allowed modular substitution of complementary assets such as software 
and peripheral hardware. Iansiti and Levin (2004) called a ―keystone firm‖ (similar to what 
Gawer and Cusumano (2002) referred to as a platform leader) a firm that drives industrywide 
innovation for an evolving system of separately developed components. Gawer and 
Henderson (2007) described a product as a platform when it is one component or subsystem 
of an evolving technological system, when it is strongly functionally interdependent with 
most of the other components of this system, and when end-user demand is for the overall 
system, so that there is no demand for components when they are isolated from the overall 
system. 
 Taken together, these studies suggest several generalizations with regard to what makes 
for the best industry platform and how this can affect competitive dynamics as well as 
innovation at the ecosystem level. Positions of industrial leadership are often contested and 
lost when industry platforms emerge, as the balance of power between assemblers and 
component-makers changes. At the same time, industry platforms tend to facilitate and 
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increase the degree of innovation on complementary products and services. The more 
innovation there is on complements, the more value it creates for the platform and its users via 
network effects, creating a cumulative advantage for existing platforms: As they grow in 
adoption, they become harder to dislodge by rivals or new entrants, with the growing number 
of complements acting like a barrier to entry. The rise of industry platforms may also raise 
complex social welfare questions regarding tradeoffs between the social benefits of platform-
compatible innovation versus the potentially negative effects of preventing competition on 
overall systems. 
 It follows that the design principles or ―design rules‖ for industry platforms overlap 
somewhat with those for internal and supply-chain platforms, but go beyond them to serve a 
larger purpose. For example, the stability of the platform architecture is still essential, but 
there are important differences. In contrast to what happens for internal and supply-chain 
platforms, the logic of design for industry platforms is inverted. Instead of a firm being a 
―master designer‖ or assembler, here we start with a core component that is part of an 
encompassing modular structure, and the final result of the assembly is either unknown ex 
ante or incomplete. In fact, for truly successful industry platforms, the end-use of the end-
product or service does not seem to be fully pre-determined by the platform owner. This 
creates unprecedented scope for innovation on complementary products, services and 
technologies. The situation simultaneously evokes the fundamental question of how 
incentives (for third-parties) to innovate can be embedded in the design and governance of the 
platform.  
 This leads to another apparent design rule for effective industry platforms: The 
interfaces around the platform should be sufficiently ―open‖ to allow outside firms to ―plug 
in‖ complements as well as innovate on these complements and make money from their 
investments. This resonates well with research by Chesbrough (2003) and others (von Hippel, 
2005) on open innovation. However, recent research on platforms highlights the complex 
trade-offs between ―open‖ and ―closed‖ (Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2009; 
Greenstein, 2009; Schilling, 2009; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008).  These researchers suggest 
that, while opening up interfaces should increase complementors‘ incentives to innovate, it is 
important to preserve as proprietary some source of revenue and profit. It therefore adds a 
more subtle take on the literature on open innovation that had extolled the simple benefits of 
opening interfaces. 
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 Specific strategic questions also arise in the context of industry platforms. For example, 
Gawer and Cusumano (2008) argue that not all products, services or technologies can become 
industry platforms. To perform this industry-wide role and convince other firms to adopt the 
platform as their own, the platform must (1) perform a function that is essential to a broader 
technological system, and (2) solve a business problem for many firms and users in the 
industry. While necessary, these conditions alone are still not sufficient to help firms 
transform their products, technologies or services into industry platforms, nor indicate how 
platform leaders can stimulate complementary innovations by other firms, including some 
competitors, while simultaneously taking advantage of owning the platform. 
 One particular challenge for innovation dynamics is that platform leaders and 
competitors must navigate a complex strategic landscape where both competition and 
collaboration occur, sometimes among the same actors. For example, as a technology evolves, 
platform owners often face the opportunity to extend the scope of their platform and integrate 
into complementary markets. This creates disincentives for complementors to invest in 
innovation in these complementary markets. Farrell and Katz (2000) identified the difficulty 
for platform owners to commit not to squeeze the profit margins of their complementors. 
Gawer and Henderson (2007) show how Intel‘s careful selection of which complementary 
markets to enter (the connectors) while giving away corresponding intellectual property 
allowed the firm to push forward the platform/applications interface.  Intel thereby retained 
control of the architecture at the same time it renewed incentives for complementors to 
innovate ―on top of‖ the newly extended platform.  
 Another challenge is that, as technology is constantly evolving, platform leaders need to 
make business decisions and technology or design decisions in a coherent manner. For 
example, consider a firm that designs open interfaces to its platform: this will stimulate 
innovation on complements, and the firms that will act as complementors by designing these 
complements need therefore to be treated by the focal firms as allies, not potential competitors. 
This will mean that the focal firm should probably refrain from entering as a competitor in 
complementors‘ markets if it wishes to sustain the complementors‘ incentives to innovate. 
This need for coherence across business decisions and technological design decision can be 
difficult to achieve since these decisions are often made by different teams within the 
organization. The coherence imperative requires top management‘s awareness of the 
interdependencies between these decisions, and the right internal process in place to allow 
ongoing coordination across functional silos. Hence, to make the whole greater than the sum 
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of the parts, we can see the need in many complex systems industries for one firm or a small 
group of firms to act as a ―platform leader‖ (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). 
 
 Network Effects and Multi-Sided Markets 
 Perhaps the most critical distinguishing feature of an industry platform compared to an 
internal company platform or supply chain is the potential creation of network effects. As 
mentioned earlier, these are positive feedback loops that can grow at exponentially increasing 
rates as adoption of the platform and the number of complements rise. The network effects 
can be very powerful, especially when they are ―direct‖ (sometimes called ―same-side‖) 
between the platform and the user of the complementary innovation, such as how Facebook 
attracts users, friends of users, and friends of friends of users. In some cases these network 
effects are also reinforced by a technical standard that makes using multiple platforms 
(―multi-homing‖) or switching from one platform to another difficult or costly. For example, 
some Windows applications require other users to have the same application. Or Facebook 
users can only view profiles of friends and family within their groups. The network effects 
can also be ―indirect‖ or ―cross-side,‖ and sometimes these are equally or even more powerful.  
Indirect effects occur when, for example, advertisers become attracted to the Google search 
engine or to Facebook because of the large number of users. Companies can also innovate in 
business models and find ways of charging different sides of the market to make money from 
their platform or from complements and different kinds of transactions or advertising 
(Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006).  There may be some limits to network effects, 
however. For example, in a study of ecosystems for mobile computing and communications 
platforms, Boudreau (2012) has found that the positive feedback loop to the number of 
complementors does not perpetuate itself ad infinitum. Too many complementors at some 
point may discourage additional firms from making the investment to join the ecosystem. 
 In parallel with the strategy literature, some researchers in industrial organization 
economics have begun using the term platform to denote markets with two or more sides, and 
potentially with network effects that cross different sides. Such a ―multi-sided market‖ 
provides goods or services to several distinct groups of customers, all of whom need each 
other in some way and rely on the platform to mediate their transactions (Evans, 2003; Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003 and 2006). While the concept of a multi-sided market can sometimes apply 
to supply-chain platforms as well as industry platforms, it does not entirely conform to either 
category. Nonetheless, there are important similarities between industry platforms and multi-
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sided markets. Among the similarities are the existence of indirect network effects that arise 
between two different sides of a market when customer groups must be affiliated with the 
platform in order to be able to interact or transact with one another (Armstrong, 2006; 
Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans, 2003, Hagiu, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2003 and 2006).  
 At the same time, not all multi-sided markets are industry platforms as we describe 
them in this paper. Double-sided markets where the role of the platform is purely to facilitate 
exchange or trade, without the possibility for other players to innovate on complementary 
markets, seem to belong to the supply-chain category. A multi-sided market that stimulates 
external innovation could be regarded as an industry platform. However, while all industry 
platforms function in this way, not all multi-sided markets do.  For example, dating bars and 
web sites, a common example used in the literature, are double-sided markets in that they 
facilitate transactions between two distinct groups of customers, although there need not be a 
market for complementary innovations facilitated by the existence of the platform. 
 The emerging literature on double-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003 and 2006; 
Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans, 2003) is particularly useful to 
understand the ―chicken-and-egg problem‖ of how to encourage access to a platform for 
distinct groups of buyers or sellers.  Nonetheless, the literature has limitations as platform 
research. For example, it takes for granted the existence of the markets that transact through 
the platform. With the notable exceptions of Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) and Hagiu 
(2007a and 2007b), this literature has delivered only limited insight into why such platforms 
come into existence in the first place: the drivers of platform emergence and evolution. Most 
research focuses on pricing as the key to encouraging access and adoption. In a welcome 
development, however, Evans (2009) focuses on start-up platform strategies, while Hagiu 
(2007b), Eisenmann et al. (2009), and Boudreau and Hagiu (2009) focus on the importance of 
non-price mechanisms for the governance of platform ecosystems. They suggest, in 
accordance with Gawer and Cusumano (2002), that pricing alone cannot be the answer to the 
inevitable strategic questions of platform dynamics, such as how to share risks among 
members of an ecosystem. These papers take double-sided (or multi-sided) research to the 
next level and bridge the strategy and product design literature as well as the industrial 
organization economics literature. 
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Platform Leadership and the Case of Intel 
We have learned from industry case studies that platform leaders can occupy both an 
enviable and problematic strategic situation:  They are central players in an ecosystem but 
may be highly dependent on innovations and investments from other firms. Far from 
remaining passively impacted by the decisions of others, however, the evidence suggests that 
platform leaders have a variety of strategic alternatives to influence the direction of 
innovation in complementary products and services by third parties. In our view, therefore, 
platform leaders are organizations that successfully establish their product, service, or 
technology as an industry platform and rise to a position where they can influence the 
trajectory of the overall technological and business system of which the platform is a core 
element. When done properly, these firms can also derive an architectural advantage from 
their relatively central positions.  
At the same time, platform leaders generally want to maintain or increase competition 
among complementors, thereby maintaining their bargaining power over these partner firms. 
Platform leadership is therefore always accompanied by some degree of architectural control 
(Schilling, 2009) as well as interdependence. Again, the momentum created by the network 
effects between the platform and its complementary products or services can often erect a 
barrier to entry for potential platform competitors.  
It follows that, in contrast to internal product platforms, establishing an industry platform 
requires more than technical efforts and astute decisions about design and architecture.  The 
industry-wide goal is to facilitate complementary innovations by third-party firms. Platform 
leaders must also strive to establish a set of business relationships that are mutually beneficial 
for ecosystem participants and be able to articulate a set of mutually enhancing business 
models.
4
  
For example, Gawer and Cusumano (2002, 2004, 2008) have studied several examples of 
industry platforms and the behaviour of leading companies in those markets. In particular, 
based on their analysis of Intel, with comparisons to Microsoft, Cisco, Palm, and NTT 
DoCoMo, they developed a specific concept of ―platform leadership,‖ along with associated 
strategic activities and practices. Their 2002 study in particular describes the key actions Intel 
took to rise from a simple component maker to supplier within a system architecture that it 
                                                 
4
 While platform leaders will often claim that establishing trust between themselves and complementors is 
essential to their success, recent research (Perrons, 2009) explores in detail the issue of trust in platform 
leadership and attempts to separate empirically whether the alignment platform leaders obtain from 
complementors is due to coercion or due to trust. 
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had not designed, and then to transform itself into a major source of influence over the 
evolution of the personal computer.
5
  
Beginning in the early 1980s, Intel (founded in 1968) has contributed an essential 
hardware component, the microprocessor, to personal computers originally designed by IBM 
in 1981. Meanwhile, Microsoft (founded in 1975) has contributed an essential software 
component, the operating system, as well as some key applications products such as Office. 
The PC market grew rapidly during the 1980s and industry leadership shifted from Apple 
(founded in 1976), which introduced the successful Apple II in 1977, to IBM, and then to 
Intel and Microsoft.  Intel executives in the early 1990s, however, became convinced it would 
be increasingly difficult to continue growing PC demand for at least two reasons:  First was a 
nearly obsolete PC architecture, which made it difficult to handle new graphical applications 
or communications functions (remote database access as well as fax and telephony, video 
conferencing, etc.). Second was the lack of technical leadership to advance the PC ―system‖ – 
basic hardware and software as well as new applications and connections to peripherals such 
as printers, cameras, fax machines, scanners, and the like.  
In other words, Intel entered the market merely as a component supplier to IBM. Fairly 
quickly, though, the aging IBM-compatible PC became a problem in that the system 
architecture and limited software prevented Intel chips from reaching their maximum 
performance levels. This was especially clear when compared to the Macintosh computer 
(introduced in 1984) and high-performance work stations using RISC (reduced instruction-set 
computing) architectures. The problem was serious for Intel because what had become its 
primary business – designing and manufacturing microprocessors for personal computers — 
was an enormous growth opportunity that required billions of dollars in investment for each 
microprocessor generation.  Yet the systemic nature of the PC meant that the success of the 
platform involved many actors that Intel did not control.  Dozens if not hundreds of 
companies (in particular, all the suppliers for this architecture) had a stake in the IBM-
compatible PC design. Yet no single supplier of software or other components (chip sets, 
screens, keyboards, printers, the operating system, or applications) could evolve the overall 
system by itself, let alone change it significantly.   
Therefore, the first challenge Intel faced was that the architecture of the system was less 
advanced and much more difficult to use than competing computer systems such as the 
                                                 
5
 The following section follows Gawer and Cusumano (2002) [Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft and 
Cisco drive industry innovation], Chapter 2: Intel‘s rise to platform leadership. 
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Macintosh. The second was that no one seemed capable of moving the platform technology 
forward in a way that was satisfactory for users or for Intel. Intel executives, led by co-
founder and chairman Gordon Moore, and CEO Andy Grove, were also thinking ahead to the 
trajectory of innovation in which they were planning to invest. They intended to develop a 
stream of more powerful microprocessors frequently and regularly in subsequent years. (This 
investment pattern, where microprocessor power increases on a predictable basis while prices 
fall, came to be known as ―Moore‘s Law.‖) A solution to the problem of the PC architecture, 
from Intel‘s perspective, had to accommodate management‘s future vision for the company. 
In 1991, Intel executives established a laboratory to address these fundamental technical 
and strategic challenges. This group would be called the Intel Architecture Lab – or IAL. 
Grove initiated the creation of IAL by asking Dr. Craig Kinnie, who had had already been 
involved in previous system-design effort within Intel, to tackle this issue that the PC 
platform was not moving ahead as fast as Intel would like. Kinnie went on to head the IAL 
for the next ten years and came to champion IAL‘s vision – both inside and outside Intel. 
Grove wanted the Intel Architecture Lab to become the ―architect of the open computer 
industry.‖ 6   Kinnie recalled how ―Dr. Grove concluded that … we needed to provide 
leadership to the industry to cause the platform to evolve more quickly, to get new 
applications and new uses for the platform… Andy Grove essentially asked me — his specific 
words — to become the architect for the open computer industry, to help the industry figure 
out how to evolve the platform. A narrow view of that would be to pretend that I was in a 
large company like IBM and that all these other companies worked for me and my boss, and 
that we could work together.‖7  
During the mid-1990s, IAL‘s mission evolved so that IAL became ―a catalyst for 
innovation in the industry.‖8 More specifically, IAL became proactive in helping Intel with 
what company people called ―Job 1‖ – selling more microprocessors, the main source of 
Intel‘s revenue and profit. By driving or ―orchestrating‖ innovation activities at other firms 
that complemented Intel microprocessors, IAL engineers tried to create new uses for 
computing devices and thus help generate demand for new computers – most of which would 
                                                 
6
 Author interview with Dr. Craig Kinnie, Director, Intel Architecture Lab, Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, Oregon, 
USA, 11 November 1997. 
7
 Author interview with Dr. Craig Kinnie, op. cit. 
8
 Author interview with Dave Johnson, Director of the Media and Interconnect Technology Lab, Intel 
Architecture Lab, Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, Oregon, USA, 20 August 1998. 
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probably use Intel microprocessors.
9
 By 1997, IAL‘s mission had become even broader: ―to 
establish the technologies, standards and products necessary to grow demand for the extended 
PC through the creation of new computing experiences.‖10 Accordingly, IAL became actively 
involved in driving architectural progress on the PC system, but also in stimulating and 
facilitating innovation on complementary products, and finally coordinating many firms‘ 
innovative work in the industry, attempting to push forward the development of new system 
capabilities. Table 1 is a list of representative IAL activities during 1997-1998 aimed at 
orchestrating industry-level innovation as well as developing open system interfaces to 
stimulate complementary products and services from third parties. Table A in the Appendix 
provides further details on the industry initiatives aimed at coordinating industry innovation. 
 
Table 1: A list of Intel’s platform leadership activities (1997-1998) 
 Projects Type of Project Did Intel share 
Intellectual 
Property for 
low royalties? 
 
Did Intel engage 
in cross-industry 
coordination, or 
in other forms of 
facilitation of 
complementors’ 
innovation? 
1 Networked Multimedia  Industry initiative N first/Y later Y 
2 Manageability  Industry initiative Y Y 
3 Big Pipes (Broadband) Industry initiative Y Y 
4 Security  Industry initiative Y Y 
5 Anywhere-in-the-Home  Industry initiative Y Y 
6 Advance-the-Platform Industry initiative Y Y 
7 PCI (Peripheral Component 
Interface) 
System interface Y Y 
8 AGP (Advanced Graphics 
Port) 
System interface Y Y  
9 USB (Universal Serial Bus) System interface Y Y  
10 1394 (also called FireWire) System interface Y Y  
11 TAPI (Telephony 
Application Programming 
Interface)  
System interface Y Y 
12 H.323 (Computer telephony 
interface) 
System interface Y N first/Y later 
13 Home Radio-Frequency System interface Y Y 
14 DVD (Digital Video Disk) System interface Y Y 
                                                 
9
 Author interview with Carol Barrett, Marketing Manager, Intel Architecture Lab, Hillsboro, Oregon, USA, 5 
August 1998. Also, ―Intel Architecture Labs, Overview,‖ undated Intel internal document. 
10
 Intel internal document, ―Intel Architecture Lab: Overview‖ (1998). 
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15 CDSA (Security) System interface Y Y 
16 Indeo (Intel Video) System interface N first/Y later N first/Y later 
Source: adapted from Gawer (2000) and Gawer and Henderson (2007) 
  
The Intel case and comparisons to other firms suggests that companies aiming to establish 
their products, technologies, or services as industry platforms need to orchestrate third-party 
innovation on complements in the context of a coherent set of strategic moves. Gawer and 
Cusumano described these strategic options as the ―four levers‖ of platform leadership: (1) 
firm scope (the decision on which, if any, complements to make in-house); (2) technology 
design (degree of modularity in the platform) and intellectual property strategy (for example, 
free and open access to platform interfaces or services versus not free and closed); (3) external 
relations with complementors (such as initiatives to promote investments in complementary 
innovations); and (4) internal organization (company structures such as IAL or processes that 
minimize conflicts should they arise, such as when the platform leader makes complements 
that compete directly with ecosystem partners).  
 We can see successful platform leaders both encouraging and constraining innovation. 
Intel separated internal product or R&D groups that might have conflicting interests among 
themselves or clash with third-party complementors, such as chipset and motherboard 
producers. The latter relied on Intel‘s advance cooperation to make sure their products were 
compatible with Intel‘s latest products. When Intel decided that these chipset and 
motherboard producers were not making new versions of their products available fast enough 
to help sell new versions of its microprocessors, Intel started making some of these 
intermediate products itself – to stimulate the end-user market. Nonetheless, it still kept its 
laboratories in a neutral position to work with ecosystem partners.  This decision was crucial 
to establish and maintain Intel‘s reputation as a trustworthy partner in the ecosystem, itself a 
difficult task because of strong short-term incentives to take advantage of innovation 
developed by less dominant complementors. (See Gawer and Henderson, 2007, and Farrell 
and Katz, 2000 for a further discussion on this issue.)  
 
Platform Leadership and the Innovator’s Dilemma 
 Market positions supported by a widely adopted platform, a global ecosystem of 
complementors, and strong network effects should be more difficult for competitors to 
dislodge than competitive advantage stemming from standalone products more subject to 
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rapid change based on technology trends, fashion, or short-term pricing. Yet even the most 
powerful platform leaders may face challenges similar to the issues described by Clay 
Christensen in The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997):  Success ties a firm to its existing customers 
as well as the technology, products, and business models associated with those customers. 
This dependence can make it difficult for a firm to change and counter innovations that are 
lower priced and initially less capable but on a trajectory for improvement.  
 A number of well-known firms have experienced this type of ―innovator‘s dilemma‖ 
in their product businesses, such as computer disk drives. We argue here that, although 
platform leadership gives the central firms an important advantage, it does not make them 
immune to this same innovator‘s dilemma.  While we need more systematic research on this 
topic, in some cases, it may become even more difficult for leading firms to evolve their 
platforms when they have millions of customers and hundreds if not thousands of ecosystem 
partners helping to sustain a platform position. As seen in the case of Intel, and in the 
examples below, platform leaders first have to evolve their own internal capabilities and 
approaches to technological innovation and business strategy.  Equally important, they must 
bring along with them an entire ecosystem of users and partners, and coordinate at least 
incremental innovation on a broad scale.
11
  
 
 IBM versus Intel and Microsoft 
 Again we find it useful to return to the case of IBM, whose origins date back to the 
1880s and a business based on electro-mechanical tabulating machines and time-punch 
devices. This company created the first global platforms in the modern computer era, 
beginning with the System 360 mainframe in the mid-1960s. Antitrust initiatives pressured 
IBM to release information to independent maintenance providers, which eventually led to an 
opening of the system architecture and an ecosystem of hardware ―clone‖ makers led by 
Amdahl and Fujitsu as well as software product and service companies focused on IBM 
customers (Grad 2002, p. 71). IBM faced more competition in the 1970s and in later years 
from vendors of smaller computers, and, as we discussed earlier, lost architectural control 
over its personal computer to Microsoft and Intel during the 1980s (Fisher, Mackie, and 
Manke, 1983; Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 1996). Nonetheless, IBM remained a major player 
in the computer industry due to its deep expertise in data-processing solutions. It had sold 
                                                 
11
 This section is based on Cusumano (2011) [The Platform Leader‘s Dilemma]. 
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primitive electronic computers since the early 1950s and for decades before that dominated in 
tabulating machines and other office equipment. In the 2000s, this deep customer knowledge 
and technical capabilities helped IBM continue to dominate the diminished mainframe market 
as well as move into Internet servers and do pioneering work in high-performance systems.  
IBM‘s role as an industry platform leader clearly changed as enterprise computing evolved to 
become a much more heterogeneous world of computer hardware and software of different 
shapes and sizes.  
 To IBM‘s credit, by 1980, a few key executives had realized that a platform shift was 
occurring and their decisions led to the introduction of the IBM PC in 1981. The operating 
system and microprocessor turned out to be the two key components of the new PC platform, 
and IBM had outsourced these technologies to Microsoft and Intel. Here we have a case 
where supply-chain partners evolved to become the new industry platform leaders. To its 
credit again, though, after absorbing billions of dollars in losses during the latter 1980s and 
early 1990s, IBM reinvented a major part of its business again. Under new CEO Louis 
Gerstner, hired from RJR Nabisco in 1993, it became the champion of ―open systems‖ (Linux, 
Java, the Internet, ubiquitous computing, and the cloud). Gerstner and his successors also sold 
off commodity hardware businesses and refocused the company around services and 
middleware software products that help customers utilize different platform technologies 
(Gerstner, 2002).   
 The insight here for both managers and researchers is the need to be aware of how 
quickly platforms and markets can evolve, and how the leader of one generation can lose 
control over the next, even to ecosystem partners. We can also see that, with the right 
management and strategy, as well as organizational flexibility, the platform leader‘s most 
critical capabilities and customer knowledge may transfer to the next generation.  In this 
example, IBM had decades of experience that helped personnel understand the data-
processing needs of enterprise users and other large organizations.  This is where Gerstner 
kept his focus, despite years of prior disagreements within IBM on what strategy and structure 
the firm should adopt in the future.  The market shift away from the mainframe and the loss of 
control over the PC platform were both highly damaging financially to IBM, but these 
changes also created the basis for a more service-oriented company and a new business model.  
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 JVC and Sony 
 In the 1970s, video-cassette recorders (VCRs) became the highest volume consumer 
electronics product as everyone with a television set became a potential customer.  Although 
Sony established what we can call a dominant design with an earlier product (the 1971 U-
Matic) and then won the race to produce a viable home device, the Japan Victor Corporation 
(JVC) ended up as the market winner. Several Japanese firms had studied Ampex‘s 
technology for broadcasters in the late 1950s, and both JVC and Sony found ways to 
miniaturize and improve the technology for a broader market.  They beat several rivals in 
Japan, the United States, and Europe, including Toshiba, RCA, and Philips.  It took 15 years 
or so of experimentation and R&D before Sony introduced the Betamax in 1975 and JVC 
countered with the VHS in 1976. By 1978, however, VHS had passed Betamax in sales. It 
became a global platform in that JVC licensed the VHS technology widely, allowed other 
companies like RCA and General Electric in the United States to influence feature 
development (such as recording time), and cultivated a large set of outside firms for video 
content licensing and distribution. The Sony Betamax was first to market and may have had 
slightly better recording quality. It also initially had a shorter recording time, and Sony was 
not very eager to make design changes in its discussions with potential partners. JVC went on 
to become a multi-billion-dollar company, based mainly on the VHS platform (Rosenbloom 
and Cusumano, 1987; Cusumano, Rosenbloom, and Mylonadis, 1992).  
 Compared to JVC, Sony had a much broader product line, deeper technical skills, and 
more financial resources.  After the Betamax, it also learned to cooperate better with other 
firms when it came to setting digital video standards, or introducing the PlayStation platform 
for video games and the Blu-ray format for DVDs.  Nonetheless, although both Sony and JVC 
earned billions of dollars in revenues from their VCR products, and JVC in particular rose to 
global prominence based on this one major success, both firms also failed to grasp how new 
software and networking technologies were changing the world of consumer electronics. JVC 
diversified from audio and video equipment to computer storage products, but never evolved 
to dominate another market and in 2008 merged with Japanese audio equipment producer 
Kenwood. The Sony Walkman, introduced in 1979, generated large revenues after Betamax 
sales faded and could have been the foundation for a new type of platform, like Apple‘s iPod 
and iPhone a well as iTunes. Yet Sony chose to focus mainly on standalone hardware 
products, with the exception of the PlayStation.   
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 The insight here again is that platform leaders need to prepare for both technological 
and business model change, in their internal product platforms and in their external platforms. 
This may be especially true when they are highly focused and successful with a particular 
type of technology and business. If we compare Sony and JVC with our prior example, it even 
seems that IBM, a much larger firm with an even longer history, has been able to evolve 
customer and technical knowledge as well as its business models more flexibly and creatively. 
For example, JVC probably would have performed better after the VCR era had it evolved its 
skills more quickly from analogue to digital technology, and to networked systems and 
hardware driven by software rather than software driven by hardware.  Sony faced the same 
challenges and did better with its greater resources but still has had major difficulties 
competing with leading firms around the world, such as Apple or even Samsung.  Though it 
still makes Walkman multimedia devices as well as PCs, smart phones, and video game 
consoles, and owns its own music label and movie studio, Sony continues to look for hit 
hardware products and always seems to find itself trailing in more complex, multi-sided 
platform markets (Tabuchi, 2012).   
 
 Google and Nokia 
 Google‘s platform was initially an Internet search engine that became nearly 
ubiquitous on PC desktops with the downloadable and free toolbar. The company then built 
an Internet portal, replete with email, maps, applications, storage, and other features, to 
surround and feed user traffic to the search engine.  Google monetizes its leadership position 
by selling targeted ads that accompany searches, but Google has not stopped there. The 
company realized years ago that most computing would one day be on mobile devices.  
Google bought and then refined the Android operating system (which is based on Linux) and 
created the Chrome browser and operating system to facilitate mobile computing as well as 
mobile searches and advertising (Levy, 2011). Perhaps most important is that Google in 2012 
became the largest smartphone OS provider with Android.  Not even Google, however, has 
done everything right.  It was slow to see the importance of social networking and has been 
trying for years (with limited success) to create a coalition of partners to gain access to more 
social networking and social media content – again, presumably, to sell more search and 
advertising. It has not built much following for its Chrome-based ―netbook‖ computers. Its 
2011 acquisition of Motorola Mobility may also create tensions with Google‘s hardware 
partners for Android phones, such as Samsung and HTC.   
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 Another platform leader that probably has lost the most revenue and market value due 
to the transition to smartphones is Nokia.  The Finland-based company in 2012 remained the 
largest producer of cell phones; its Symbian operating system was for years the dominant 
software platform for basic handsets.  From 2009-2010, however, mobile sales quickly moved 
to smartphones that required more sophisticated software.  Not surprisingly, during this period 
and afterwards, Nokia saw its market share, market value, and financial performance suffer 
dramatically as Apple‘s iPhone handsets, and a variety of devices from different companies 
running Google‘s Android software, came to dominate the market (Kenney and Pon, 2011). 
Nokia removed its CEO and hired a former Microsoft executive, Steven Elop. He then 
announced plans to abandon the Symbian operating system as well as another joint OS project 
with Intel. Nokia has now adopted Microsoft‘s Windows phone software for its next 
generation of smartphones.  
 The insight here is that platform leaders, like any market leader, must think broadly 
about potential competitors from adjacent markets as well as manage the evolution of their 
technology, business models, ecosystem partnerships, and marketing capabilities, no matter 
how successful they may be. Google has always focused on search, but computing has been 
moving beyond the desktop for years and even beyond the Internet – to multiple devices, 
especially mobile phones, as well as applications and content that reside within both open 
(such as the Internet) and closed (such as Facebook) networks.  Google has been evolving 
successfully while continuing to challenge the modus operandi of the computer industry – 
proprietary technology, such as from Microsoft and Apple.  Its software is both free (no 
license fees) and open (there is access to the source code and developers can modify some 
parts of the software).  It is hard for companies that charge for their technology and do not 
have large advertising income or other sources of revenue to beat Google‘s Android platform 
strategy.  Platform leaders must be prepared to supplement or even discard their platforms, as 
IBM has done, if that is what survival requires. If they fail to develop new technology 
internally or find suitable acquisitions, then they may well find themselves adopting the 
platform technology of a competitor, as Nokia has recently done with Microsoft Windows.   
 
 Microsoft versus Apple   
 Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft since Bill Gates handed over the reins in 2000, has 
sometimes been criticized for not moving the company much beyond the PC platform.  
Indeed, in 2012, Windows desktop and server as well as the Office suite still accounted for 
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nearly 80 percent of Microsoft‘s revenues and almost all its profits. Microsoft was under 
particular pressure because its share price and market value have been stagnant or declining 
since the end of the Internet boom (though this was also true of Intel, Cisco, Nokia, and a host 
of other high-tech firms).  By contrast, despite the small (but rising) global market share of 
the Macintosh personal computer, and despite its near bankruptcy only a few years ago, Apple 
has been growing sales at 50 or more annually in recent years and surpassed Microsoft in 
market value back in 2010.  Apple was growing so fast because, unlike Microsoft, it evolved 
beyond the slow-growing PC business and became a major player in newer, more rapidly 
growing markets – smartphones, tablets, digital content, and software product distribution.   
 To be fair, Microsoft remains extremely profitable with PC software products, which 
have a marginal cost approaching zero and generally much higher profit margins than tangible 
products (Cusumano, 2004). It has also survived disruptive technological transitions and 
daunting business-model challenges (character-based to graphical computing, the Internet, 
Software as a Service and cloud computing, mobile computing, and social networking) as 
well as survived global antitrust scrutiny and major violations (for example, with Netscape 
and Internet browsers).  Billions of dollars in losses from MSN and Bing over some 15 years 
have prepared Microsoft for the online world of ―cloud computing‖ funded by advertising 
revenue, even though this threatens its traditional packaged software business.  In addition, 
Microsoft has recently learned how to break up Windows into smaller, more manageable 
modules, which should help it compete better and may also facilitate the delivery of new 
Internet-based services. At the same time, the Windows Azure cloud offering and SaaS 
versions of major products have had good receptions in the marketplace. Microsoft‘s decision 
in 2011 to buy the Internet telephony service Skype also seems part of an attempt to move 
beyond the PC and get access to new customers. Other moves include Microsoft‘s alliance 
with Nokia in smartphone software and an earlier alliance with RIM to take over the search 
business on the Blackberry smartphones.   
 
Conclusions 
 This paper has discussed some of the major differences between internal and external 
platforms and how these can impact product innovation. Both kinds of platforms should be 
designed and managed strategically to accomplish the goals and further the competitive 
advantage of the platform owner. Internal platforms allow their owners to achieve economic 
gains by re-using or re-deploying assets across families of products developed by either the 
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firm or its close suppliers.  By contrast, industry platforms allow firms to manage a division 
of innovative labor that originates beyond the confines of the firm or its supply-chain. 
Industry platforms can facilitate the generation of a potentially very large number of 
complementary innovations by tapping into the innovative capabilities of an a priori 
unconstrained set of external actors, and provide the technological foundation at the heart of 
innovative business ecosystems. As the skills to innovate in technologies (such as ICT) have 
become globally distributed, the concept of industry platforms provides a useful template for 
the management of exploration of possible avenues for collective value creation structured 
along technological trajectories. Importantly, this is an inherently dynamic process. As our 
examples indicate, a critical issue for managers is to learn to manage the evolution of their 
industry platforms and accompanying ecosystems and make interrelated technological and 
business decisions.  For example, ecosystem governance should include reinforcing the 
business models of members, which is essential to sustain their incentives to invest and 
produce complementary innovations.  
  The examples of Intel and other companies suggest there are particular practices that 
effective platform leaders follow (Table 2). Platform leaders who aim to tap into the 
innovative capabilities of an external ecosystem need to develop a vision for their platform 
and promote this among potentially key players in the present and the future.  They need to 
build a sufficiently open or modular architecture to facilitate third-party innovation. They 
need to build a vibrant coalition around their platform and carefully manage ecosystem 
relationships that are mutually beneficial for participants. They need to continue evolving the 
platform and the ecosystem, as well as associated business models, to remain competitive as 
challengers emerge and as markets and technologies change. Overall, the effective practice of 
platform leadership entails a set of internal processes that enable managers to make 
technological decisions on the one hand and strategic business decisions on the other, in a 
coherent manner – even if the decisions must take place in different parts of the organization.  
 This imperative for coherence creates challenges not only for practitioners, as internal 
divisions of labour lead to organizational silos, but also for scholars – who need to look across 
their own academic silos. For these and other reasons, the phenomenon of industry platforms 
offers a rich research opportunity to cross-fertilize several disciplines.  In particular, we see 
three sets of platform-related research questions that should help advance our understanding 
of innovation strategy, organizational behavior and networks, and management of 
technological change.  
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Table 2:  Effective Practices for Platform Leadership 
 
1. Develop a vision of how a product, technology or service could become an essential part of a 
larger business ecosystem 
a. Identify or design an element with platform potential (that is, performing an essential 
function, and easy for others to connect to). 
b. Identify third-party firms that could become complementors to your platform (think 
broadly, possibly in different markets and for different uses)  
2. Build the right technical architecture and ‗connectors‘ 
a. Adopt a modular technical architecture, and in particular add connectors or interfaces 
so that other companies can build on the platform 
b. Share the intellectual property of these connectors to reduce complementors‘ costs to 
connect to the platform. This should incentivize and facilitate complementary 
innovation. 
3. Build a coalition around the platform: Share the vision and rally complementors into co-creating 
a vibrant ecosystem together  
a. Articulate a set of mutually enhancing business models for different actors in the 
ecosystem 
b. Evangelize the merits and potentialities of the technical architecture 
c. Share risks with complementors 
d. Work (and keep working) on firm‘s legitimacy within the ecosystem. Gradually build 
up one‘s reputation as a neutral industry broker 
e. Work to develop a collective identity for ecosystem members  
4. Evolve the platform while maintaining a central position and improving the ecosystem‘s 
vibrancy 
a. Keep innovating on the core, ensuring that it continues to provide an essential (and 
difficult to replace) function to the overall system, making it worthwhile for others to 
keep connecting to your platform 
b. Make long-term investments in industry coordination activities, whose fruits will 
create value for the whole ecosystem.  
  
   
First, we still do not understand very well how industry platforms emerge. The economics 
literature has so far not tackled this question, as researchers tend to assume that the platform 
already exists (as well as its associated markets on each ―side‖ of the platform). The literature 
on technological change and competitive dynamics, dominant designs, and on organizational 
processes, could usefully address the question of platform emergence and ecosystem creation 
as well (see, for example, Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Murmann and Frenken, 2006; Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010). The difficulty to follow the emergence of platforms may be compounded 
by the inherent methodological difficulty involved when attempting to follow the emergence 
of an unknown entity, when one cannot know ex-ante who the actors involved in the 
emergence process will be. Attempting to address this issue, empirical studies such as Le 
Masson et al. (2009) whose focus is on collective design processes for developing industry 
platforms, open up useful theoretical and methodological avenues by utilizing design theory 
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methodologies that allow to follow objects as they emerge. The classification of platforms 
offered in this paper may indicate that, under certain conditions, there could be an evolution 
from internal platforms to external platforms, but this hypothesis would need to be developed 
and tested. 
 A related important area of further research is that of the emergence and evolution of 
business ecosystems. The networks approach from the organizational literature (see Brass et 
al, 2004 for a review), by bringing its insights on network dynamics and field evolution 
(Powell et al, 2005) and strategic networks (Gulati et al., 2000; Lorenzoni and Liparinni, 
1999), is well-positioned to make significant contributions in this area. In particular, recent 
work by Nambisan and Sawhney (2011), building on Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), develops 
explicitly the link between platform leadership and orchestration processes in network-centric 
innovation. The new institutional literature rooted in sociology offer concepts such as 
legitimacy, collective identity, and institutional work, which can be useful to determine 
whether and how platform leaders can successfully establish themselves as trustworthy 
brokers. 
 Third, our understanding of the impact of platforms on innovation and competition still 
needs to be refined. In the literatures we have reviewed (economics, innovation, operations, 
strategy), technological platforms are associated with a positive impact on innovation. The 
positive effect stems from the fact that, by offering unified and easy ways to connect to 
common components and foundational technologies, platform leaders help reduce the cost of 
entry in complementary markets, and provide demand for complements, often fuelled by 
network effects. Platforms therefore offer a setting where it is in the interest of private firms 
to elicit and encourage innovation by others. However, concern over the dominant positions 
that platform leaders such as IBM, Microsoft, Google, or Apple can achieve has raised 
awareness that platforms may have a potentially negative effect on competition and possibly 
on innovation, especially non-incremental innovation. We suggest that as scholars we need to 
further refine our argument about platforms and innovation.  
 For example, further theory development could examine the role of interfaces and 
architecture, and how platform design might focus the attention of innovators onto specific 
trajectories of technological change (Dosi, 1982).  These might take the form of what Nathan 
Rosenberg (1969) called ―inducement mechanisms and focusing devices.‖ It is possible that 
platform leaders tend to successfully stimulate a certain kind of externally-developed 
innovation (that would complement the platform), while aiming to discourage another kind of 
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innovation (that would diminish the appeal or the perceived value of the platform). This type 
of research would highlight the potential trade-offs between innovation on modules or 
discrete products versus innovation on systems.  
29 
 
APPENDIX TABLE A.  INTEL COORDINATION INITIATIVES IN 1997-1998 
 
 
IAL Initiative 
Mission Key programs Diffusion 
Networked 
Multimedia 
Make multimedia pervasive on the Net 
and provide the best experience on the 
high-performance Connected PC 
Scalable, MMX Technology 
optimized media engines; Efficient 
media network transports and 
services: tools and services 
H.323 stack in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 4.0; supported by 
firewall vendors; but also products Indeo Video 5.0; and also 
building blocks WDE ships as part of Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer 4.0; RSVP and RTP ship in Windows 98 and Windows 
NT 5.0. 
Manageability Enable platform and network 
infrastructure to make Intel 
Architecture systems the most easily 
manageable and the best managed 
Industry specifications and industry 
groups; software development kits 
Specifications, Software Development Kits; but also products: 
Intel NIC 12  and LanDesk Software products; Also, diffused 
through Microsoft, as ingredients: Wake-on-LAN13 and Wake-on-
Ring NICs and Modems in NT, Win 98. 
Big Pipes Increase content delivery capacity of 
the connected PC to allow home and 
business customers to easily receive 
new broadband digital content 
Common software architecture for 
PC broadband transport; reference 
designs 
Networking connectivity products. 
Security Make PC interaction trustworthy for 
communications, commerce, and 
content 
 
Industry specifications and industry 
groups, drives the CDSA 
standardization effort; software 
development kits 
Open specifications and industry groups, CDSA R2.0, in 
OpenGroup; OpenGroup standard, IBM licensed. Products also: 
IBM and Intel shipping product based on CDSA standard. And 
also, licenses to Zoran: DVD copy protection 
Anywhere-in- 
the-Home 
Unleash the potential of home PCs with 
new uses that deliver computing power 
and content when, where, and how it’s 
is needed in the home. 
PC-friendly protocols and 
standards; concepts demos and 
prototypes. 
Standards, Control-InfraRed – with Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, 
and Sharp; Home- Radio-Frequency – with Compaq, IBM, and 
HP; and Home Device Control.  
Advance-the-
Platform 
Establish the media, communications, 
and interconnect building blocks for the 
next generation high performance Intel 
Architecture platforms 
Interconnects USB, AGP, 1394 A/B; 
future processor optimizations, 
visual PC 2000 
AGP drivers, USB compliance workshops, PC-friendly 1394A 
specifications. No commercialized products. Ingredients in 
Microsoft’s products: Real-time services in WDM in Windows 98 
and Windows NT 5.0. 
Source: Gawer and Henderson (2007) 
                                                 
12 NIC = Network Interface Card, an expansion board (i.e., a printed circuit board) that can be inserted into a computer so the computer can be connected to a network. Most NICs are designed for a 
particular type of network, protocol, and media, although some can serve multiple networks. (Source: www.webopedia.com) 
13 LAN= Local Area Network. A computer network that spans a relatively small area. 
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